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INTRODUCTION

When a federally insured savings and loan association founders on
unsound loans, slipshod management, or a lousy economy, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the "FSLIC") may
place and manage the association in a Receivership. For creditors of
the association, the Receivership may mean pursuing claims against
the association through a detailed, unfamiliar administrative claims
process, and for debtors of the association, it means limited defenses
* Associate, Cox & Smith, San Antonio, Texas. B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of California, Berkeley.
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when sued by the FSLIC for collection on the debtors' obligations.
This article is addressed to those who face that administrative process
and limited defenses.
Section II of the article describes the statutory framework surrounding the FSLIC, and its parent agency, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (the "FHLBB"), and the FSLIC's dual role and powers
as a Receiver and as an independent Corporation, including the power
to enter into, and the mechanics of, Purchase and Assumption Transactions ("P&A's"). Section III discusses the procedural rules and the
priority of claims in an FSLIC Receivership. In Section IV, the article addresses the courts' role in the claims process, by explaining both
the circumscribed defenses available to a debtor of the failed association when he is either sued by the FSLIC Receiver or by the FSLIC
Corporation which has purchased the claim from the Receivership,
and by discussing the rights of a creditor of the association to file an
original court action against the FSLIC Receiver.'
1. This article does not describe the full array of statutes, regulations and case law relating to the savings and loan industry. Rather, it covers certain federal statutes and regulations
and decisions of Texas and federal circuit courts regarding asserting claims against, or defending claims held by, a federally insured savings and loan which has entered an FSLIC Receivership. This article does not discuss how a depositor claims payment from the FSLIC
Corporation as an insurer of accounts up to $100,000, for that, see 12 U.S.C. § 1728 (1982)
and 12 C.F.R. § 564.1-564.11 (1988). The article also does not discuss the conservatorship or
receivership of a federally insured bank or the roles of the United States Comptroller of the
Currency [12 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1982)], the Federal Reserve System [12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522
(1982)], or the FDIC [12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982)], nor does it address Texas agencies and
statutes regulating and providing for the conservatorship or receivership of a state chartered
bank, (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-201 to 342-951 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1989)) or
savings and loan associations (TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a (Vernon 1964 & Supp.
1989)). The article does address the adversarial situations between creditors and obligors of
the insolvent association and the FSLIC, but it does not discuss either the actions taken by the
FHLBB or the FSLIC to aid a troubled S&L short of Receivership or the aspects of a borrower
attempting to work out a troubled loan with an association in Receivership. For a discussion
of some of these other topics, see Macey & Miller, Bank Failure Risk Monitoring, and the
Marketfor Bank Control, 58 U. COLO.L. REV. 1153 (1988); MacDonald & Mrofka, Dealing
with the FDIC, FSLIC and Other FinancialAgencies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS 1987 ADVANCED REAL ESTATE LAW COURSE

G1-29 (1987); Skillern, Closing and Liquidating of

Banks in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 830 (1972); Skillern, FederalDeposit Insurance Corporationand
the FailedBank. The Past Decade, 99 BANKING L.J. 233, 292 (1982). This article's comments
apply to the receivership of federally chartered savings and loans, savings banks and interim
federal association, and where noted, state chartered, but federally insured, savings and loans,
building and loan associations, homestead associations, cooperative banks and interim state
banks. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 500.4, 561.1 (1988)(defining "insured institution" and detailing scope
of FSLIC coverage). These federally insured institutions are sometimes collectively referred to
in the article as "S&L's."
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II.
A.

THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF SAVINGS AND LOANS

The Alphabet of Federal Regulation

Federal regulation of the savings and loan industry began with the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act ("Home Loan Act"), 2 the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 ("Home Owners' Act"),3 and the National
Housing Act ("Housing Act"), 4 which were congressional reactions
to the savings and loan industry crisis caused by the economic depression of the 1930's.5 Homeowners faced foreclosure and savings and
loans confronted uncollectible debts. The collapsing savings and loan
industry caused depositors to lose or close their accounts, exasperating the industry's weakened condition.6 To alleviate the crisis, the
Home Loan Act created the FHLBB,7 which under the Home Owners' Act 8 and the Housing Act 9 chartered federal savings and loans
and savings banks. 10 The FHLBB also required that these federal institutions pay low interest rates on deposits, which permitted the associations to charge lower interest on loans, thus making loans more
2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3. Id. §§ 1461-1470.
4. Id. §§ 1701-1750g.
5. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW) (brief history of statutory regulation of S&L's).
6. Bank Protection Act of 1968, S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2535-36 (savings and loan industry depends
on public confidence). During the 1970's and 80's, the savings and loan industry again financially deteriorated, this time because of factors including an increase in interest rates paid on
deposit accounts without the concomitant increase in interest received from existing loans, a
shift from a home loan portfolio to commercial real estate lending, a decline in the value of
both residential and commercial property, regional economic depression, and increased competition. See Biscayne Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 572 F. Supp. 997, 1009 (S.D. Fla.
1983)(brief history of reasons industry again became financially troubled); see also Rosenberg
& Given, Financially Troubled Banks: Private Solutions and Regulatory Alternatives, 104
BANKING L.J. 284 (1987)(discussing reasons for recent financial deterioration of banks).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Prior to 1955, the FHLBB was called The
Home Loan Bank Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1422 (1982)(change of name). The FHLBB has its
headquarters in Washington, D.C. with 12 district offices and additional area offices in Dallas
and Houston, Texas. 12 C.F.R. § 500.32 (1988). The governing board of the FHLBB is composed of three persons, no more than two of whom can be members of the same political party,
appointed by the President, with Senatorial advice and consent, for four year terms. The President designates the Chairman of the FHLBB. 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 12
C.F.R. § 500.10 (1988).
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9. Id. § 1701-1750(g).
10. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(a) (West Supp. 1988); 12 C.F.R. §§ 500.1-500.3 (1988).
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readily available and recapitalizing the housing market.11 Under
these three acts, the FHLBB also regulates and examines federally
chartered savings institutions, as well as certain state chartered savings institutions, to achieve good management and solvency.
The Housing Act also created the FSLIC which is under the direction of the FHLBB."2 The FSLIC acts as a Receiver or Conservator
of financially troubled S&L'sI3 and, as the FSLIC Corporation, insures withdrawable or repurchasable shares, investment certificates,
deposits, and other specified accounts in all federal and eligible state
savings and loans and savings banks.14 Most members or investors of
the S&L are insured to an aggregate of $100,000, regardless of the
15
number or amount of the customer's accounts or other investments.
The FSLIC can sue and be6 sued in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States.'
A third federal agency is the Federal Asset Disposition Association
(the "FADA") which is a stock federal savings and loan association
organized under the authority of the FHLBB,' 7 with a ten year charter, a board of directors, management officers, and its capital stock
owned by the FSLIC.' 8 Essentially, the FADA may manage and
market the assets of a S&L in Receivership by contracting with the
FSLIC Receiver to work out loans, care for repossessed property, and
sell property for the greatest possible return. A claimant in a FSLIC
Receivership may initially deal with the FADA. For example, if the
11. United States v. Kay, 89 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1937); Prato v. Homeowner's Loan
Corp., 24 F. Supp. 844, 844-45 (D.C. Mass. 1938).
12. 12 U.S.C. 1725(a), 1725(c) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 500.4 (1988). A Director is head of
the FSLIC, and the agency is divided into four divisions, including an Insurance Division
responsible for payment in cash of all insured accounts. 12 C.F.R. § 500.20 (1988). Its principal office is in the District of Columbia. 12 U.S.C. § 17.25(a) (1980).
13. Unless otherwise stated in this article, "FSLIC" will refer to the agency in both its
corporate and receivership capacities.
14. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724, 1726(a), 1728(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 12 C.F.R. §§ 500.4,
561.2, 561.3 (1988). When a state-chartered savings bank, insured by the FDIC, is converted
to a federal savings bank, the FDIC continues to insure the accounts of the institution until
relieved by the FSLIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)-(o) (Supp. V 1987).
15. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1728(a), (d) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); 12 C.F.R. § 561.6 (1988).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c)(4) (1982). See Section IV, supra.
17. FHLBB Resolution No. 85-890; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. V 1987).
18. The FADA's principal office is in Washington, D.C. and its administrative headquarters are in San Francisco, California with a Dallas, Texas regional office. See generally Liechty
& Pettey, Dealing with Failing Lending Institutions Prospective and Retrospective Views, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, EMERGING
ASSISTANTS

ISSUES

IN REAL ESTATE LAW FOR LAWYERS AND LEGAL

(1988).
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claimant wished to foreclose on a lien on property repossessed by the
S&L, and now managed by the FADA in an FSLIC Receivership, he
may initially confer with the FADA on the condition of the property
and FADA intentions regarding its disposal. The FADA, however,
does not litigate or decide claims, and the FSLIC must approve many
of its proposals regarding property.1 9 While the FADA must disclose
the limitations on its powers to make binding agreements and representations,2 ° the practitioner should fully understand the FADA's
powers in a particular Conservatorship or Receivership before negotiating and reaching any agreement regarding claims held by or against
his client.
B.

The FHLBB's Regulatory Powers

The FHLBB has invasive regulatory powers, including the authority, after notice and administrative hearing before that agency, to decree that a S&L or its directors, officers, employees, or any other
person participating in the association's affairs not take an action
which the FHLBB determines is an unsafe or unsound business practice or violative of a rule of law.2 1 It may also issue orders to correct
the results of such actions already taken.2 2 In an emergency, such as
imminent insolvency, the FHLBB may issue a temporary cease and
desist order which is effective until set aside or limited by a court
order, the dismissal of the charges by the FHLBB, or the effective
date of a final cease and desist order.2 a When the acts of the S&L's
directors, officers, employees or other persons involved in its affairs
are sufficiently egregious, the FHLBB may suspend them from office
or prohibit their participation in the S&L's affairs, hold a hearing on
the matter, and issue a permanent order. 24 These acts by the FHLBB
are subject to court review.2 5
19. See id.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(E) (Supp. V 1987).
21. Id. § 1464(d)(2).
22. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(a).
23. Id. § 1464(d)(3)(A).
24. Id. § 1464(d)(5); see also 12 C.F.R. § 509a (1988)(regarding FHLBB's powers and
procedures to remove officer, director, employee or other person charged with certain crimes);
12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(9), 1464(d)(10) (1980); 12 C.F.R. §§ 509.1-509.22 (1988)(regarding procedures for hearings before FHLBB on charges under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)). This article does
not completely detail the FHLBB's regulatory powers.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7) (1982); see Barrett, JudicialReview of Agency Cease and Desist
Orders: The Gains and Losses for FinancialInstitutions, 100 BANKING L.J. 18, 19 (1983).
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The FHLBB's most topical power is to appoint a Conservator or
Receiver for any federal savings and loan 26 and, in certain cases, a
state chartered institution where the accounts are insured by the
FSLIC.2 7 Conservators or Receivers may be appointed when (1) the
S&L's assets are less than obligations to creditors and others; (2) its
assets or earnings have been substantially dissipated by violation of
law or rule or by unsafe business practices; (3) its condition is too
unsafe or unsound to transact business; (4) there has been a willful
violation of a final cease and desist order; (5) there is concealment of
information or assets from the examiner or the FHLBB;28 (6) the S&L
consents to the Receivership or Conservatorship; (7) the S&L is removed from membership in any federal home loan bank; or (8) the
S&L's insurance with the FSLIC or FDIC is terminated.29 Normally,
the FHLBB appoints the FSLIC as a Conservator, Receiver or other
legal custodian.3 ° While the FHLBB can rapidly place an S&L into
Receivership and seize its assets, 31 an S&L may challenge the Receivership within thirty days by filing suit. 32 If the S&L's directors challenge the Receivership or Conservatorship,3 3 any action which the
FSLIC is prosecuting or defending on behalf of the S&L will be
stayed pending a court ruling on the appointment.34 The courts are
split on the scope of their review of the FHLBB's decision to appoint
a Conservator or Receiver, with some holding that the review is lim-

26. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(A), 1464(d)(11), 1729(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987); 12 C.F.R.
§ 500.3 (1988).
27. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(c)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1988); see, e.g., Guaranty Say. and Loan
Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d 1339, 1340 (8th Cir. 1986)(where state gave approval, FHLBB
appointed FSLIC as Receiver for federally insured, state chartered savings and loan); Telegraph Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 1983)(FHLBB could
appoint FSLIC as Receiver of state chartered, federally insured, savings and loan where institution was closed under state law and holders of withdrawable accounts were unable to withdraw funds from account).
28. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1988); 12 C.F.R. § 547.1 (1988).
29. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1988); 12 C.F.R. § 547.3 (1988).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 547.6 (1988).
31. 12 C.F.R. § 547.2 (1988). If any of grounds one through five exist, the FHLBB may
act without notice. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972)(seizure of assets does not require
notice or pre-seizure due process). For a receivership or conservatorship under grounds six or
seven, a notice of appointment is mailed to the S&L and immediately filed for publication in
the Federal Register. 12 C.F.R. § 547.4 (1988).

32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(A),(D) (Supp. V 1987); 12 C.F.R. § 547.5 (1988).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
34. Id.
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ited to one under the Administrative Procedure Act"5 as to whether
the statutory basis for appointment existed 36 and others holding that,
even where a statutory basis is present, the court may examine the
wisdom of the FHLBB's decision.3 7
C.

The FSLIC as Conservator and Receiver
FSLIC, as a Conservator or Receiver, may "do all things ...desira-

ble or expedient to carry on the [S&L's] business.., and to conserve
8 Generally, the FSLIC as a
*3....
and preserve the [S&L's] assets
Conservator takes the place of the members, directors, and officers of
the S&L and assumes their powers 9 whereas, as a Receiver, the

FSLIC completely becomes the S&L, succeeding to its rights, titles,
powers, and privileges and those of its officers, directors, and
members. 4o
The FSLIC, as Conservator or Receiver, may (1) take over the assets and operate the S&L; (2) take such actions as may be necessary to

put the S&L in a solvent condition; (3) merge the S&L with another
insured institution; (4) organize a new federal savings and loan association to take over the S&L's assets; (5) proceed to liquidate the assets
of the S&L in an orderly manner; or (6) make such other dispositions
as it deems appropriate.4 ' It may also (1) discharge and pay off liens,
charges and claims against the S&L, its assets, or the FSLIC as Con-

servator or Receiver; (2) preserve and rehabilitate the S&L's assets;
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1977 & Supp. V 1987).
36. Telegraph Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
aff'd, Telegraph Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1983). This limited
review after appointment is consistent with Congress' intent that the FHLBB be able to
swiftly, and without notice, aid an S&L.
37. See, e.g., Biscayne Fed. Sav.and Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 572 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (S.D.
Fla. 1983); Fidelity Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 540 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (N.D. Cal.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1983); Washington Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343, 353-54 (N.D. Ohio 1981). See generally, 65 A.L.R. FED.
302, § 2 (1983), for a collection of cases on judicial review of the FHLBB's appointment of a
Receiver or Conservator.
38. 12 C.F.R. § 548.2(a) (1988)(power of Conservator); 12 C.F.R. § 549.3(a)
(1988)(power of Receiver); see also North Miss. Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756
F.2d 1096, 1102 (5th Cir. 1985); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(D) (Supp. 1987).
39. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(6)(D) (West Supp. 1988); 12 C.F.R. §§ 547.7, 548.2(b) (1988).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 547.7 (1988). A Conservator may later surrender the S&L to a Receiver.
Id. § 547.8. However, see section IV, discussing the Fifth Circuit's holding that the FSLIC
Receiver, suing to collect obligation of the S&L, is immune from many of the defenses that
could have been asserted against the S&L.
41. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1729(b)(l)(A), 1729(c)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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(3) participate in legal proceedings brought by or against the Conservator, the Receiver, or the S&L or participate in proceedings in which
any of these parties has an interest; (4) execute, acknowledge, and
deliver documents which are necessary or proper for any purpose,
with the same binding effect as if the document were executed by an
officer of the S&L with board of director approval; (5) sell any mortgage, deed of trust, cause of action, note, contract, judgment, stock or
debt owed to the S&L; (6) release S&L assets; (7) repudiate burdensome contracts; and (8) settle claims against or in favor of the Conservator, Receiver or S&L. 42 In performing these functions, the FSLIC
as Conservator normally must first obtain the approval of the FSLIC
Director or the FHLBB and, with regard to participation in lawsuits,
act only under the supervision of the FHLBB's General Counsel.
However, the FSLIC Receiver may perform many of these acts without such approval or supervision. 4 1 While courts cannot generally restrain or affect the exercise of these and other powers granted to the
FSLIC as Receiver or Conservator," the FSLIC's powers are always
subject to the regulation of the FHLBB 45 and, where the FSLIC is
appointed Receiver or Conservator of a federally insured state
savings and loan association by a court or public authorchartered
ity, 46 the FSLIC's powers are subject to the regulation of that court or
public authority.47
1. Purchase and Assumption Transactions
In exercising its powers as Receiver for an insolvent S&L and as an
independent corporation insuring the accounts of depositors, the
FSLIC is concerned with protecting depositors and other creditors of
the S&L, as well as maintaining the financial liquidity of the FSLIC
Corporation. The FSLIC Receiver uses one of two methods to at
least partially restore depositors financially: (1) a direct cash payment
42. 12 C.F.R. § 548.2 (1988)(powers of Conservator); 12 C.F.R. § 549.3 (1988)(powers of
Receiver). Regarding the repudiation of burdensome contracts, see Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at

1102 and 50 Fed. Reg. 48,983 and 48,970 (1975)(FHLBB proposed regulations and comments
on same regarding standard of burdensome contract). See also Liechty & Pettey, Dealing with
Failing Lending Institutions Prospective and Retrospective Views, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
EMERGING ISSUES IN REAL EST'ATE LAW FOR LAWYERS AND LEGAL ASSISTANTS (1988).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 549.3(a) (1988).
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
45. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(d) (West Supp. 1988).
46. Id. § 1729(c)(1)(A).
47. Id. § 1729(d).
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to the depositor or (2) a Purchase and Assumption Transaction (a
"P&A") which is a transfer of the depositor's account to a new association established by the FSLIC for the transfer or to an already existing association.4" A direct payment involves the liquidation of the
S&L and a cash disbursement to the depositor with any shortfall between the liquidated and the deposited funds covered by the FSLIC
Corporation up to the $100,000 limit on insurance. The direct deposit
payoff has several disadvantages: the failed S&L is permanently
closed, its employees lose their jobs, accounts are frozen, and checks
returned to the drawer.49 The P&A is a more complicated but, from
the perspective of the FSLIC and the depositor, a more desirable
transaction. In a P&A, the FSLIC as Receiver sells the S&L's deposit
accounts and more collectible debts to another S&L which may already exist or be created by the FSLIC for the P&A. 50 The remaining
claims held by the S&L against other parties are usually sold to the
FSLIC Corporation for a premium which is normally then included
in the package transferred to the assuming S&L as consideration for
entering into the transaction. The FSLIC Corporation attempts to
collect the debts it purchased to offset the purchase price. A P&A
benefits several parties: the FSLIC does not pay out insurance, depositors of more than $100,000 are fully protected, the assuming S&L
expands its customer base, and industry trauma is lessened by the assuming S&L agreeing to immediately reopen the offices of the failed
one. 5 However, creditors whose claims were not transferred to the
solvent S&L are usually left with a cause of action against a Receiver48. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1728(b), 1729(a), 1729(f) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
49. FDIC v. National Union Fire Ins. Corp., 630 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (W.D. La. 1986);
Burgee, Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14
FORUM 1146, 1153 (1979).
50. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(f) (West Supp. 1988); see also Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d
862, 865-66 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); FDIC v. Eagle Properties, Ltd., 664
F. Supp. 1027, 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1985); Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 572 F.

Supp. 997, 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1983). It has been held that the FSLIC need not give notice before
engaging a P&A inasmuch as with notice depositors will withdraw their money and there will
be little or nothing to transfer. Telegraph Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 807 F.2d 590, 59192 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally Burgee, Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUM 1140, 1153 (1979); Note, Creditors' Remedies
Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National Bank, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1431-33
(1986).
51. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d at 865; Eagle Properties,Ltd., 664 F. Supp. at 1037; National
Union Fire In&, 630 F. Supp. at 1153. See generally Telegraph Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 807 F.2d 590, 591 (7th Cir. 1986); Corbin v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 475 F.
Supp. 1060, 1063-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1980); Burgee, Purchase
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ship with no significant assets. Because federal law protects the
FSLIC Corporation from certain defenses, P&A transactions may
leave the debtor of the insolvent S&L, whose obligations were sold to
the Corporation, without some of the defenses available if the FSLIC
52
as Receiver were the claimant.
III.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS BEFORE
THE

A.

FSLIC

AND

FHLBB 53

ProceduralRules for Filing a Claim with the FSLIC

If the FSLIC liquidates an S&L rather than performs a P&A, or if
the P&A does not transfer the creditor's claims to the new association, the creditor has a claim against the FSLIC Receivership which
may be pursued administratively, following procedural rules promulgated by the FHLBB in the United States Code of Federal Regulations5 4 and those soon to be codified rules published by the FHLBB in
the Federal Register.55
The claims process for creditors of the S&L,5 6 begins with the
FSLIC publishing and mailing, to the last known address of any creditor shown on the S&L books, a notice requiring him to present his
claims 57 and supporting proof. The claimant has the burden to estaband Assumption Transactions Under the FederalDeposit InsuranceAct, 14 FORUM 1146, 1153
(1979).
52. See section IV, supra. While the FSLIC Receiver is also immunized from many defenses that would have been available in a suit brought against the S&L, the FSLIC Corporation has somewhat greater protection.
53. This article does not discuss the procedure by which a depositor makes a claim from
the FSLIC Corporation as an insurer of accounts. See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 1728 (West
1980 & Supp. 1988); 12 C.F.R. §§ 564.1-564.11 (1988). Further, the described claims process
does not apply to the receiverships of a deposit association or a federal savings bank, instead
see 12 C.F.R. § 549.5-1 (1988), or to receiverships for insured state chartered institutions, see
12 C.F.R. §§ 569a.l-569a. 11 (1988). While procedures for submitting and challenging claims
in these receiverships are very similar to those for a FSLIC Receivership of a federally
chartered savings and loan, the practitioner should consult closely the applicable regulations.
54. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4, 549.5-1 (1988).
55. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 547, 548, 549, 563, 569a,
569b, 575, 576, 577)(proposed Oct. 24, 1988). For further information on these regulations
and proposed regulations, contact Christopher Bellotto, (202) 377-7401, or Judith L. Friedman, (202) 377-7399, Adjudication Division, Office of General Counsel, FHLBB, 1700 C
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20552.
56. This process does not apply to account holders with claims for FSLIC insurance. 53
Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,853 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(h))(proposed Oct. 24,
1988).
57. The FSLIC will mail the claimant an official proof of claim form. 53 Fed. Reg.
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lish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.58 The presentation
must be made by the date specified in the notice which is at least
ninety days after the notice was first published.59 Claims filed after
the specified date will be disallowed unless the FHLBB, in its discretion, approves whole or part payment from the S&L's assets remaining at the time of this approval.' The FHLBB defines a claim as "a
right to payment or other relief against the Association or the Receiver [other than for deposit insurance or a request for expedited reliefl, ' 61 including a request for or opposition to foreclosure on assets
held in the S&L's receivership. 62 "Claimant" is similarly broadly defined as "any person or entity asserting a claim against the Association or the Receiver," including, but not limited to, holders of claims
arising from the acts or omissions of the Receiver, owners of a participation interest in a loan, borrowers, guarantors, secured and unsecured creditors, and holders of mechanic's and materialmen's
liens.63
A Special Representative of the Receiver, who is named in the
FHLBB resolution appointing the FSLIC as Receiver in a particular
insolvency, along with his appointed agents, reviews the claims to determine if they were correctly filed. 61 Defective claims are returned to
the claimant along with a written explanation of deficiencies. Except
in the discretion of the Special Representative, a corrected claim must
be filed with the Receiver on or before the latter of thirty days from
the date of mailing of the deficiency notice or the filing date set in the
43,850, 43,854 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.3)(proposed Oct. 24, 1988). Uninsured de-

positors will also receive a Certificate of Claim in Liquidation for any uninsured amount on
deposit. The Certificate is retained by the receiver who will pay their claim out of the Receivership's assets, pro rata, along with the distribution to general creditors. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850,

43,854 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.6)(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
58. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.15)(proposed

Oct. 24, 1988).
59. 12 C.F.R. 549.4(a)(1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,854 (1988)(to be codified at 12

C.F.R. § 575.4)(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
60. 12 C.F.R. 549.4(a) (1988).

61. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,853 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(h))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
62. Id.

63. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,853 (1988)(to be codified at § 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(i))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).

64. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,854 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.9)(proposed Oct.
24, 1985).
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notice originally published to all claimants.6 5 After determining that
the Proof of Claim is correctly filed, the Special Representative or his
agent may seek an immediate decision or additional information from
the claimant, pose written questions to him, hold a meeting with him,
take a sworn statement, and request a legal memorandum on relevant
issues.6 6 The Receiver may disallow a claim if the claimant fails to
comply with additional requests for information. 67 The Special Representative then compiles the administrative record consisting of information he has gathered and submitted by the claimant. 6 The
claimant is given an opportunity to supplement the record before the
Special Representative renders his proposed determination on the
After reviewing the record, the Special Representative
claim. 69
prepares a legal memorandum analyzing the issues and renders proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed determination.7 ° If the claimant does not file a request for reconsideration, the
proposed determination becomes the Determination of the Receiver,
and the claimant can appeal this determination to the FHLBB and
then obtain judicial review.7 1 Should the claimant disagree with the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and the proposed
determination, he may file a written Request for Reconsideration with
the Receiver within thirty days from the date the Special Representative mails the proposed determination to the claimant.7 2 The request
must state the specific grounds for any objection. 73 The Receiver will

65. Id. Since a properly filed claim supercedes an improper one, the revised claim should
contain all relevant information and not merely be an amendment. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850,
43,854 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.9(d))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
66. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,855 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.10, 575.13)(proposed Oct. 24, 1988). The claimant may inspect and copy all non-privileged documents in the
Receiver's possession and relevant to his claim. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,855 (1988)(to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(d))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
67. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(h))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
68. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(i))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
69. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(j))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
70. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(l))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
71. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(m)(n))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
72. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,856 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(o))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
73. Id.
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then issue a determination.
Within sixty days after the date the Receiver determination is issued, the claimant may appeal the determination to the FHLBB.74
The claimant files with the FHLBB, with a copy sent to the Receiver,
a Request for Review of a Receiver's Determination, stating the facts
and arguments upon which the appeal is based." The request must
also include a special description of the factual and legal errors in the
Receiver's determination, citation to the applicable statutes, regulations, cases, and portions of the administrative record.7 6 The claimant may submit additional facts that were not available to the
Receiver.77 After submission of the notice and any additional facts,
the FHLBB will close the record and any additional materials may
only be submitted at the FHLBB's discretion.7" Within one hundred
eighty days after the record is closed, the FHLBB will then either
render a decision or entertain a supplemental proceeding, such as oral
argument, in which case, a decision will be issued thirty days thereafter.79 If the Director does not issue a decision within these time limits
and there has been no formal extension, it shall be deemed that the
FHLBB affirmed the Receiver's determination8 ° and the claimant
may obtain judicial review.8 ' Similarly if the FHLBB explicitly denies the claim, judicial review may be sought.82 If the FHLBB allows
the claim, the claimant must promptly execute and deliver to the
FHLBB a "Satisfaction of Claim," which is provided with the
FHLBB's determination.8 3 Allowed claims are paid as funds are
74. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,857 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R.

§§ 576.2-576.3)(pro-

posed Oct. 24, 1988).

75. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,857-58 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.3-576.4)(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).

76.
Oct. 24,
77.
78.

53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,858 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.4(a))(proposed
1988).
Id.
53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,858 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.5)(proposed Oct.

24, 1988).

79. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,858 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.7)(proposed Oct.
24, 1988).

80. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,858 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.9)(proposed Oct.
24, 1988).

81. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,858 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.9)(proposed Oct.
24, 1988).
82. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,858 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.1 1(b))(proposed

Oct. 24, 1988).
83. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,858, 43,850 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.1 )(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
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available and in the priority set by the FHLBB.84
A claimant may file a Request for Expedited Relief with the
FHLBB, with a copy sent to the Receive', seeking emergency relief
from the decisions or threatened actions of the FSLIC Receiver.85
The request must be filed with the FHLBB, and the copy sent to the
Receiver, within five working days from the date of the notice of the
Receiver's decision or threatened action. However, if the notice was
mailed, three additional days are allowed. 86 The claimant must submit a signed statement to the FHLBB that the request was sent to the
Receiver within the time limit.8 7 The FHLBB may grant a waiver or
extension of the deadline for good cause." In order to obtain expedited relief, the claimant must establish that he has been or will be
adversely affected by the Receiver's decision or threatened actions so
as to justify this extraordinary relief. Accordingly, the request should
contain a statement of the relevant facts and legal issues; errors by the
Receiver; all relevant documents; citations to applicable statutes, regulations, and other legal authority; an assessment of the likelihood of
the claimant's success in the merit; and a description of the harm if
relief is not granted.8 9 Only the need for emergency relief pending a
final decision on the merits are determined at this point, not the mer91
its of the claims. 90 The Receiver will file a response to the request,
and the FHLBB may request additional information. 92 The FHLBB
may, upon motion of a party or on its own, issue a temporary stay
order which prevents the Receiver from taking any action until there

84. 12 C.F.R. § 549.5(d) (1988); see Section III.B.
85. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.2)(proposed Oct.
24, 1988).
86. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.2(b))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
87. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 577.2(f),
577.3(a)(6))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
88. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.2(a))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
89. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.3(a))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
90. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.3(a))(proposed Oct.
24, 1988).
91. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.3(b))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
92. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.4(e))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
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is a decision on the Request for Expedited Relief.93 The stay will remain in effect during the period the FHLBB is considering the request
and, after the FHLBB's decision denying the request, for a time period sufficient to allow the claimant to seek judicial review, which is at
least five working days from the date of the FHLBB's decision, and
eight days if the decision was mailed. 94 The decision by the FHLBB
for expedited relief is a final action subject to judicial review. 9" This
expedited relief procedure is particularly helpful when the claimant
96
wishes to prevent the Receiver from foreclosing on a property lien.
B.

The Priorityof Unsecured Claims in a FSLIC Receivership
The FHLBB has recently established the priority for unsecured

claims in the FSLIC Receivership of an S&L. 97 The Receiver's ad-

ministrative expenses are first priority, 98 followed by the administrative expenses of the S&L, provided the association's expenses were
incurred within thirty days before the Receiver took possession of the
association and excluding the wages or salaries of the association's
employees. 99 Third in priority are the wages, salaries, vacation and
sick leave pay, and contributions to employee benefit plans of the association's employees earned prior to the Receiver's appointment, but
only if the Receiver decides to engage or retain the employee for a
reasonable time." ° If an association employee is not engaged or retained by the Receiver, then his claims for the items in category three,
93. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.4(g))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988). However, this order does not prevent the Receiver from making preparations
legally required in advance of its threatened action, such as posting for foreclosure. Id.
94. Id.
95. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.4(d))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
96. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.2(b))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
97. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,129 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 549, 569a, 569c)(proposed
June 23, 1988). These new regulations were effective as of August 4, 1988 and will replace the
priority of claims stated in 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.5-1(b), 569a.7 (1988). They apply to the FSLIC
Receivership of federally chartered savings institutions and state chartered institutions where
the FSLIC is appointed Receiver. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,129, 25,130 (1988).
98. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c.11(a)(l))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
99. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c. 11(a)(2))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
100. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c. 1l(a)(3))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [2022], No. 4, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:827

up to $3,000 per person, are fourth in priority. 0°' Next are the claims
10 2
by governmental units for taxes, other than federal income tax.
Sixth in priority are claims by depositors for the uninsured portions of
their withdrawable accounts and all other claims not falling in a
higher category, which have accrued or become unconditionally fixed
by the date of default."13 A claim based on the Receiver's rejection or
repudiation of an unexpired lease or executory contract falls in category six."° If the association is state chartered and operates under
the laws of a state which provides that depositors of withdrawable
accounts have a higher priority than general creditors, then the Receiver will follow that priority in category six.' 5 Seventh in priority
are the general claims which have not accrued or become unconditionally fixed on or before the date of default,10 6 including claims for
interest earned after default on claims under category six. 107 Next are
the United States' claims for federal income taxes, 0 8 then claims
which have been partially or wholly subordinated to the claims of
general creditors,' 0 9 and finally the claims of holders of non-with101. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c.1l(a)(4))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
102. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c. 1l(a)(5))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
103. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 569c.11(a)(6) (1988). Default is defined as
"an adjudication or other official determination of a court of competent jurisdiction or other
public authority pursuant to which a conservator, receiver, or other legal custodian is appointed for an insured institution for the purpose of liquidation." 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988);
53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.l(d))(proposed Oct. 24,
1988).
104. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,589 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. 569c. 1l(c))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
105. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. 569c.1 l(c))(proposed June 23, 1988).
106. Claims based on an agreement for accelerated, stipulated or liquidated damages are
in this category if the claim did not accrue before the date of the default. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133
(1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.l1(a)(7))(proposed
Oct. 24, 1988).
107. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988). Interest on claims under category 6 is the average rate,
during the preceding three months, for United States Treasury Bills with maturities of not
more than 91 days. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c. 1l(b))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
108. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c.1 l(a)(8))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
109. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c.1 l(a)(9))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988). These claims are given priority within this
category as specified in the instruments evidencing the claims.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss4/3

16

Phillips: Asserting and Defending Claims Involving an FSLIC Relationship.

1989]

FSLIC CLAIMS

drawable accounts.' 10
All unsecured claims in any category must be paid in full or provision made for payment before any claim of a lesser category is paid,
and if there are insufficient funds to pay all claims in a single category
or class, distribution to the claimants in that category or class will be
pro rata.II However, the Receiver may pay claimants in any of categories one through six out of order even though claimants in a higher
priority category have not been fully paid, provided the Receiver determines that the distribution to the lower priority claimants is reasonably necessary to the effectiveness of the Receivership and
adequate funds exist or will be recovered during the Receivership to
pay in full all claims of higher priority.
IV.

THE

FSLIC

AND THE COURT PROCESS

The FSLIC enters the court in different roles: as a Receiver collecting the S&L's debts or being sued by those with claims against the
Association and as a Corporation collecting obligations purchased
from an FSLIC Receivership.1 12 The bad news for a plaintiff suing to
collect the obligations owed to the S&L is that the FSLIC Corporation and Receiver are immune from several defenses normally available to the obligors. The good news is that with the Supreme Court's
decision in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,1 13 the FSLIC
Receiver may be sued by the S&L's creditors in a federal court or
state original action.
A.

The FSLIC's Common-Law Defenses

When the FSLIC Corporation and the FSLIC Receiver sue to collect the S&L's obligations, federal common law immunizes the FSLIC
from defenses that are based on the S&L's agreements with, or representations to, the obligor if those agreements and representations were
110. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12

C.F.R. § 569c.l l(a)(10))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988). The priority of these claims within this
category are also governed by the documents evidencing the claims.
111. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,133 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,859 (1988)(to be codified at 12

C.F.R. § 569c.1 l(d))(proposed Oct. 24, 1988).
112. The FSLIC may also be sued in its corporate capacity by depositors claiming some

wrong in the payment or nonpayment of FSLIC insurance of accounts. However, as noted in
footnote 1, infra, the claims process for FSLIC insurance and the right to sue the FSLIC
Corporation are not covered by this article.
113. No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989) (WESTLAW).
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designed or tended to deceive creditors or the public authorities regulating the S&L, and if the obligor lent himself to this deception. 1 4
Further, the FSLIC Corporation, when suing to collect obligations
purchased from the Receivership, is a holder in due course,11 5 and
consequently, has the additional HDC immunity from the obligor's
defenses. 116
1. The FSLIC's Immunity Under D'Oench
Federal common-law protection has developed from the United
States Supreme Court's decision in D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v.
FDIC,"7 the United States Congress' codification of D'Oench in 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e), the Supreme Court's interpretation of section
1823(e) in Langley v. FDIC,"' and various lower court decisions applying the Supreme Court holdings and section 1823(3).119 While
D'Oench, section 1823(e), and Langley specifically deal only with the
FDIC Corporation's immunity, the Fifth Circuit1 20 and other
courts 12 ' have extended the D'Oench holding to the FSLIC Corpora-

tion, and the Fifth Circuit held that the D'Oench holding applies to
the FDIC and FSLIC Receiver. 22 Further, the Fifth Circuit and
other courts heavily rely on the analysis of Langley and cases apply114. Langley v. FDIC, _ U.S. _, _, 108 S. Ct. 396, 401-402, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340, 347-48
(1987); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1988). But see D'Oench, Duhme &
Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Robbins v. Robbins, 91 Bankr. 879 (W.D. Mo.
1988)(FDIC Receiver merely takes place of bank and does not have federal common law or
statutory protection which FDIC has against defenses to bank's claims).
115. Hereafter "HDC."
116. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1256-57. The Fifth Circuit has not decided whether the FSLIC
or FDIC Receiver enjoys the protection of an HDC. See FSLIC v. LaFayette Inv. Properties,
Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988). While at least one Federal District Court within
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Receiver is not an HDC, this court stated in dicta that the
Receiver has at least some of the protection of an HDC under federal common law. FSLIC v.
Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1986). But see FirstSouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc.,
858 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1988)(federal law evolving towards view that FSLIC receiver has
HDC status); FSLIC v. Sandor, 684 F. Supp. 403, 405 (D.V.I. 1988)(FSLIC as Receiver excluded from HDC status).
117. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
118. - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 396, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1987).
119. See FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1988)(discussingD'Oench and
Langley).
120. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1253-54, 1256-57.
121. Andrew D. Taylor Trust v. Security Trust Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 844 F.2d 337,
341 (6th Cir. 1988).
122. FSLIC v. Kroenke, 858 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Condit, 861 F.2d
853 (5th Cir. 1988)(dicta); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.l (5th Cir. 1986); see
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ing section 1823(e) to define the scope of the FSLIC's common-law
protection under D'Oench. 2 3 Accordingly, a discussion of D'Oench,
section 1823(e), and Langley, and cases applying them to the FDIC,
as well as those cases directly addressing the FSLIC's immunity, is
useful.
During the early development of a federal regulatory and insurance
framework for the banking industry, the United States Supreme
Court in D'Oench 124 addressed the situation where the FDIC Corporation sues to collect the obligations it purchased from a FDIC Receivership and the obligor defends by relying on "secret agreements"
entered into by the obligor and bank prior to the Receivership which
the obligor argues relieve him of liability. In D'Oench, the defendant
sold bonds to the bank and, in a scheme with the bank, executed notes
payable to the bank so that if the bonds defaulted, the bank would not
have to show this default on its books. 25 The receipts for the notes
stated that they would not be called for payment.1 26 The bonds defaulted, the bank entered an FDIC Receivership, and the FDIC Corporation, which was unaware of the receipts, acquired the defendant's
obligation in a P&A and sued for payment. 27 The defendant asserted
that his side agreement with the bank precluded the lawsuit. The
Supreme Court held that federal common law applied 28 and under
that law the defendant's participation in the scheme of deception estopped him from relying on his side agreement with the bank:
The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or the
public authority or would tend to have that effect. It would be sufficient
in this type of case that the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangeFDIC] relied in inment whereby the banking authority on which [the
1 29
suring the bank was or was likely to be misled.
also First Nat'l Bank of Andrews v. FDIC, MD-88-CA-274 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
1989)(WESTLAW).
123. FSLIC v. Lafayette Inv. Properties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988);
FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp.
1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1986).
124. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 447 (1942); see also McClanahan,
795 F.2d at 514-15 (discussing circumstances and policy considerations surrounding D'Oench).
125. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 454.
126. Id.
127. Id. The FDIC actually sued on a note renewing the original notes executed by the

defendant. Id.
128. Id. at 455-56. State law may supplant this federal law where it does not interfere
with federal objectives. FDIC v. Armstrong, 784 F.2d 741, 744 (6th Cir. 1986).
129. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942).
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It did not matter that the defendant had not executed the notes to
deceive the FDIC, only that he had at least lent himself to a scheme
whereby creditors and banking authorities could be misled. 130
D'Oench allows federal and state examiners to safely rely on a financial institution's records.1 31 Such reliance is important in determining solvency for regulatory purposes and particularly important
when the Receiver is liquidating the institution and must decide
whether to pay off depositors with federal insurance or perform a
P&A. 132 In deciding whether to perform a P&A, the Receiver must
value the failed institution's claims to determine if the Corporation's
purchase price for those claims will provide enough money to entice a
solvent bank into assuming the deposit accounts of the failed institution. 133 Similarly, the Corporation must quickly value the obligations
to determine the purchase price. 134 Accordingly, the Receiver and
Corporation have no time for a detailed investigation into all defenses
to an obligation and, with D'Oench, the investigation is unnecessary.
Congress essentially codified the D'Oench holding as it applies to
the FDIC in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) which sets out the standards a collateral agreement must satisfy to be a defense against the FDIC Corporation's enforcement of obligation acquired in a P&A. 13s
130. Id. at 461. The FDIC did not even exist when the defendant executed the original
notes. Id. at 454; see also FSLIC v. LeFere, 676 F. Supp. 764, 769 (S.D. Miss. 1987)(even if
obligor enters into side agreement in good faith he cannot rely on agreement if part of scheme
to defraud). In the lower court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the FDIC
was a holder in due course and, as such, immune from a defense based on the receipt. The
Supreme Court in D'Oench did not address this issue, but other courts have subsequently
agreed with the Eighth Circuit. See Section IV.A.2, supra.
131. Langley v. FDIC, _ U.S. _, _, 108 S. Ct. 396, 401, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340, 347
(1987)(discussing policy considerations behind section 1823(e)); FSLIC v. Port Allen Dev.,
684 F. Supp. 439, 440 (M.D. La. 1988); Beighley v. FDIC, 676 F. Supp. 130, 132 (N.D. Tex.
1987).
132. Langley, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 401, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 346-47.
133. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 870 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982). As discussed infra, the Receiver includes funds from the sale of claims to the Corporation in the package offered to the assuming institution.
134. Id.
135. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the [FDIC]
corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a loan or
by purchase, shall be valid against the corporation unless such agreement (1) shall be in
writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or persons claiming an
adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the
bank or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board
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Generally, section 1823(e) requires that the agreement be written,
signed by the bank and the obligor, be adopted by the bank's board of
directors or loan committee, with this adoption reflected in the minutes of the board or committee, and remain part of the bank's official
records from its execution. 136 It has been held that section 1823(e)
does not deprive an obligor of his rights in violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution. 137 Presumably, the Court would have likewise held if D'Oench had been challenged on those constitutional grounds.
The Supreme Court's most important recent decision interpreting
section 1823(e) is Langley v. FDIC 31 where the Court held that the
standards of section 1823(e) must be met even when the obligor's defense is not based strictly on a side agreement with the bank but on
the bank's misrepresentation or warranty. In Langley, the defendants
borrowed money from a bank to finance the purchase of land. 139 The
bank went into a FDIC Receivership and the Receiver performed a
P&A, selling the defendants' notes to the FDIC Corporation which
then brought suit."4 The obligors defended that they were fraudulently induced to sign the notes by the bank's misrepresentations of
the amount of total acres and mineral acres to be conveyed and misrepresentations that there was no outstanding mineral lease on the
property.14 ' The defendants argued that section 1823(e) did not preclude these defenses which were not based on an "agreement" but on
representations and warranties by the bank.142 The Supreme Court,

or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an
official record of the bank.
136. Id. At least two district courts in the Fifth Circuit have held that if an "agreement"
does not meet the requirements of section 1823(e) it not only cannot be the basis of a defense
but also cannot be the basis for an affirmative action against the FDIC Corporation. RSR
Properties, Inc. v. FDIC, MO-88-CA-200 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 1989)(WESTLAW); Beighley v.
FDIC, 676 F. Supp. 130, 132-33 (N.D. Tex. 1987). One district court has so stated in dicta.
FDIC v. Amberson, 676 F. Supp. 777, 778, n. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1987). However, if the Claimant
obtains a judgment against an S&L prior to the FSLIC Receiver's takeover, that judgment is
enforceable against the Receiver since D'Oench protects the FSLIC, not the S&L. Grubb v.
FDIC, 86-1687, 86-1728 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 1989)(WESTLAW) (discussing this rule as applied
to the FDIC).
137. Beighley, 676 F. Supp. at 133.
138. _ U.S. ., 108 S. Ct. 396, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1987).

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at -'
Id. at
Id.
Id. at .,

,

108 S. Ct. at 399-400, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 345-46.
108 S. Ct. at 399, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 345.
108 S. Ct. at 401, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 346-47.
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quoting D'Oench, rejected this distinction and held that "agreement"
in section 1823(e) cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to disserve the
purpose of D'Oench:
Certainly, one who signs a facially unqualified note subject to an unwritten and unrecorded condition upon its repayment has lent himself
to a scheme or arrangement that is likely to mislead the banking authorities, whether the condition consists of performance of a counterpromise
(as in D'Oench) or of the truthfulness of a warranted fact. 143
Since the defendants in Langley had signed a facially unqualified note
which they contended was subject to an unwritten and unrecorded
condition regarding certain characteristics of the land, they lent themselves to a scheme or arrangement that was likely to mislead the banking authorities. '"
The Court in Langley further held that, under section 1823(e), it
was not relevant whether the bank's representation or warranty was
45
made to fraudulently induce the obligors into executing the notes,1
nor was it relevant whether the FDIC had knowledge of the bank's
misrepresentation prior to its acquisition of the note.'4 6 Similarly, it
has been held by lower courts that the FDIC's actual or constructive
knowledge of a defense does not preclude the application of
47

D'Oench.1

The courts have applied D'Oench or section 1823(e) to protect the
FDIC against several types of defenses, including those asserted by
guarantors that the bank misrepresented that the obligor was a good
143. Id. at

- ,108

S. Ct. at 402, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 348.

144. The Court's holding in Langley overruled those decisions which had held that

D'Oench does not apply to "factual fraud," that is factual misrepresentation not involving an
agreement. See, e.g., FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1985); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 867 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); FDIC v. Amberson, 676
F. Supp. 777, 780 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
145. Langley v. FDIC, _ U.S. , _, 108 S. Ct. 396, 402-03, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340, 349-50
(1987).
146. Id. This latter holding was based on the statutory language of section 1823(e) which
does not explicitly exempt a side agreement from the statute's standards if the FDIC is aware
of the agreement. It is questionable whether under D'Oench, which is an equitable theory,
such knowledge is relevant. However, at least one court has held that under Langley the
FSLIC's knowledge of the agreement does not "necessarily" make D'Oench inapplicable. An-

drew Taylor Trust v. Security Trust Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, Inc., 844 F.2d 337, 342 (6th
Cir. 1988).
147. FDIC v. Investors Associate X, Ltd., 775 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1985); RSR Properties,
Inc. v. FDIC, MO-88-CA-200 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 1989)(WESTLAW).
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credit risk148; that the bank would obtain additional collateral from
the note maker 49 ; that the bank would complete an executed blank
guaranty so that the guarantors would collectively be responsible for
only 25 percent of the debt 50 ; and that the bank misrepresented that
if the guarantor had to pay the debt he would receive the collateral.' 5
D'Oench and section 1823(e) have been applied to defenses by note
makers that the bank misrepresented that it would complete a blank
promissory note so as to limit the obligor's liability' 5 2 ; that the bank
waived any right to accelerate the note upon default by prior acceptance of late payments' 5 3; that the bank completed a blank note given
by the defendant with the incorrect amount 54 or incorrect terms' 5 5;
that the bank agreed it would not seek a deficiency against the borrower 56; that the leader had agreed to provide the borrowers further
financing' 57 ; that the failed bank's wrongful conduct should be imputed to the FDIC Corporation under the bankruptcy rule of equitable subordination'; and that the obligor and bank had entered into
an accord and satisfaction. 159
D'Oench similarly has been applied to immunize the FSLIC Corporation against many defenses, such as that the association fraudulently induced the obligor to sign the note by promising that his
endorsement would be released when the document evidencing security for the loan was "completed""'°; that the association misrepre148. FDIC v. Galloway, 856 F.2d 112, 116-17 (10th Cir. 1988)(applied section 1823(e)).
149. FDIC v. Amberson, 676 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Tex. 1987)(applied section 1823(e)).
150. FDIC v. Castle, 781 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1986)(applied section
1892(e), however, court strongly indicated that D'Oench would also prohibit defense); FDIC v.
Powers, 576 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984)(applied
both section 1823(e) and D'Oench to prohibit this defense).
151. Malone v. FDIC, 611 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. FDIC v. Armstrong, 784 F.2d 741, 744-45 (6th Cir. 1986)(applied section 1823(e)).
153. FDIC v. Caledonia Inv. Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 383-84 (1st Cir. 1988)(applied section
1823(e)).
154. FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1985)(applied section 1823(e)).
155. FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1986)(applied D'Oench).
156. FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enters., 642 F.2d 785, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1981)(applying section 1823(e)).
157. Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 972 (1982); FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1981).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982); see also CTS Trust, Inc. v. FDIC, 859 F.2d 357, 362 (5th
Cir. 1988)(applied section 1823(e)).
159. FDIC v. Manatt, 688 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
160. FSLIC v. Lafayette Inv. Properties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1988).
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sented its solvency and that the notes would be extended when due 161;
that the association entered into an accord and satisfaction with the
obligorl 62; that the association orally modified the terms of the obligation1 63; and that the obligors' representative had executed the notes on
behalf of the obligors in violation of the representatives' side agreements with the obligors."M
However, D'Oench does not completely protect the FSLIC or
FDIC from the obligor's defenses. If the obligor was completely innocent and had not even lent himself to a scheme of deception,
D'Oench does not apply.1 65 D'Oench does not preclude a defense
based on "fraud in the factum," such as if the obligor's signature had
been forged, nor does it apply if the note imposed bilateral obligations
66
on the parties and the bank breached its obligation under the note. 1
It does not apply if a judgment extinguished the obligation before it
was purchased by the FSLIC Corporation. 67
V.

THE

FSLIC

AS AN

HDC

In recent years, as the courts continued to develop the FSLIC's and
161. FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1986).
162. FSLIC v. Port Alan Dev. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 439, 440 (M.D. La. 1988)(applied
D'Oench and Langley).
163. FSLIC v. Kroenke, 858 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir. 1988).
164. McLemore v. Landry, 687 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (M.D. La. 1988)(applied D'Oench
and Langley).
165. FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1974)(where defendant completely innocent and not negligent, estoppel rule of D'Oench would not be applied to prevent reliance on
defense of failure of consideration).
166. E.g., Langley v. FDIC, - U.S. -, -, 108 S. Ct. 396, 402, 98 L. Ed. 2d 340, 348
(1987); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1986); Howell v. Continental Credit
Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1981); FDIC v. National Union Fire Ins., 630 F. Supp.
1149, 1154 (W.D. Ca. 1986); Riverside Park Realty Co. v. FDIC, 465 F. Supp. 305, 313 (M.D.
Tenn. 1978). It is important to note that section 1823(e) has a no fault requirement, that is, if
the side agreement does not meet the criteria of section 1823(e), it cannot be the basis of a
defense to the obligation even if the obligor was wholly innocent. Given the Court's frequent
reliance on section 1823(e) in defining the scope of D'Oench, D'Oench also may apply regardless of the obligor's fault; however, the author has not found a case so holding.
167. Grubb v. FDIC, 86-1687, 86-1728 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 1989)(WESTLAW); see also
FDIC v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 725 F.2d 634, 639 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829
(1984)(section 1823(e) not applicable when parties assert no asset exists or asset invalid and
such invalidity caused by acts independent of any side agreement); FDIC v. Prann, 694 F.
Supp. 1027, 1037 (D.P.R. 1988)(section 1823(e) inapplicable when debt that formed basis of
asset claimed by FDIC was satisfied before FDIC acquired failed bank's assets); FDIC v.
Nemecek, 641 F. Supp. 740, 742-43 (D. Kan. 1986)(settlement of bank's suit against obligor
cancelled note before FDIC acquired it, making section 1823(e) inapplicable).
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FDIC's protections under D'Oench and section 1823(e), they also created a separate body of federal common law which classifies the
FDIC and FSLIC Corporations as HDCs 168 with the accompanying
protections against defenses to the enforcement of negotiable notes.
The FDIC and FSLIC Corporations qualify as HDCs if they take a
negotiable instrument in a P&A, for value in good faith and without
knowledge of any defense against it. 169 To deny the Corporation
HDC status, they must have actual knowledge of the defenses at the
time they take the notes, and the Corporations cannot be charged
0
with constructive notice of defenses. 17
The policy reasons behind the decision to cloak the FDIC and
FSLIC Corporations with HDC protections are similar to those behind D'Oench and section 1823(e). The Receiver and Corporation
cannot make the necessarily quick valuations of the S&L's loans in a
P&A without having to guess at potential defenses available to the
obligor. 17' Further, the obligor is not unfairly prejudiced since he
should anticipate that an HDC may purchase his note, denying him
certain defenses. 172 The courts also considered that without HDC
status, the FSLIC and FDIC would not collect many obligations
owed to the failed financial institution at the expense of the institution's depositors, other creditors and the taxpayers.173 The courts created a federal common law rather than merely relying on the law of
the state where the claim arose, to ensure national uniformity and
predictability of the FSLIC's and FDIC's protection against certain
168. The Fifth Circuit has not decided whether the FSLIC or FDIC Receiver enjoys the
protection of an HDC. FSLIC v. LaFayette Inv. Properties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1988). While at least one federal district court within the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
Receiver is not an HDC, this court stated in dicta that the Receiver has at least some of the
protection of an HDC under federal common law. FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1337
(E.D. La. 1986); FirstSouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1988)(federal law evolving towards view that FSLIC Receiver has HDC status). But see FSLIC v.
Sandor, 684 F. Supp. 403, 405 (D.V.I. 1988)(FSLIC as Receiver excluded from HDC status).
169. FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. The Cremora Co.,
832 F.2d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1987); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159-61 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC
v. Eagle Properties, Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1027, 1036-37 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
170. FDIC v. Armstrong, 784 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1986); Wood, 758 F.2d at 161-62;
FDIC v. Manatt, 688 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Eagle Properties, Ltd., 664 F.
Supp. at 1045-46.
171. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1256; Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 869-70 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
172. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1256; Wood, 758 F.2d at 158-59; Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872.
173. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1257; Wood, 758 F.2d at 158.
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defenses.' 74 Because the HDC status of the FSLIC and FDIC is a
product of federal law, the practitioner cannot solely rely on state
commercial codes or related case law to determine if the FSLIC or
FDIC is an HDC as to a particular defense. However, state law will
be used by the federal courts to the extent it does not conflict
with the
175
law.
common
federal
the
federal policies that generated
The Fifth Circuit, in FSLIC v. Murray,7 6 held that the FSLIC corporation held notes which it acquired in a P&A as an HDC and was
protected from the maker's defense of material alteration.

77

Courts

have also held that the FDIC corporation, as an HDC, is protected
from the defenses of failure of consideration, 7 1 fraud in the inducement, 79 material alteration of the instrument,18° usury,181 security
fraud," 2 common-law fraud,' 8 3 waiver, estoppel, unjust enrichment, 8 4 and mental incapacity of the maker.'8 " These decisions
should control when similar defenses are asserted against claims
brought by the FSLIC Corporation.
VI.

SUING THE FSLIC RECEIVER IN COURT

Creditors of a S&L in receivership may not want to pursue their
174. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1257.

175. FDIC v. The Cremora Co., 832 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 1987); Wood, 758 F.2d at
159.
176. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1251.

177. See id. at 1257.
178. FDIC v. Armstrong, 784 F.2d at 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d
1262, 1266 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v.

Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 38 n.5 (6th Cir. 1985)(dicta).
179. Armstrong, 784 F.2d at 745.
180. Id.

181. Leach, 772 F.2d at 1266; Wood, 758 F.2d at 160-61.
182. Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d 688, 695 (6th Cir. 1981)(quoting Gunter v. Hutcheson,
492 F. Supp. 546, 555-56 (N.D. Ga. 1980)). But see Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 874
(11 th Cir. 1982)(questioning whether FDIC's status as HDC protects it from defense based on
securities fraud).
183. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 868-73; FDIC v. Amberson, 676 F. Supp. 777, 781 (W.D. Tex.
1987); FDIC v. Eagle Properties, Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1027, 1036-37 (W.D. Tex. 1985). The
Gunter court actually held that the FDIC Corporation was not an HDC because it acquired
the note in a P & A which is not in the ordinary course of business. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872.
However, the court nonetheless essentially held that the corporation has the status of an HDC
if the other requirements of HDC status are met. Id.
184. FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1984). Because this is
an Eleventh Circuit case following Gunter, the court does not strictly hold that the FDIC is an
HDC but it does have HDC protection. Id.
185. FDIC v. Ohlson, 659 F. Supp. 490, 491-92 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
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claims against the failed institution through FSLIC and FHLBB administrative territory but instead may prefer the more familiar trek
186
through an original court action.
With the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,8 7 the claimant may bring an original
de novo court action against the FSLIC or continue one previously
brought against the S&L prior to the Receivership. Coit is best understood with a history of those cases leading to this decision. Before
Coit, the law of the Fifth Circuit as stated in North MississippiSavings
& Loan Association v. Hudspeth 188 was that the claimant could not
bring or continue to maintain an original court action against an S&L
in an FSLIC Receivership without first exhausting those administrative remedies. Further, upon exhaustion of those administrative remedies, the claimant was limited to a court review of the administrative
decision.' 8 9
In Hudspeth, an S&L sought a declaratory judgment that no deferred compensation agreement existed between it and its former president, Hudspeth, or, if the agreement existed, it was terminable at
will. 9' Hudspeth counterclaimed for enforcement of the agreement. 9' The S&L was placed into a FSLIC receivership, and the
FSLIC transferred all assets and most liabilities to a newly created
S&L, but retained Hudspeth's agreement in the receivership and then
terminated that contract.' 92 Hudspeth joined the new S&L in his
counterclaim as a "transferee in interest."'' 93 The FSLIC, as Receiver, and the new S&L removed the case to federal court 94 where it
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Hudspeth had not first pursued his claim through the FSLIC and FHLBB
186. For a discussion of a claimant's right to bring an original court action against the
FSLIC Corporation, see York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 851 F.2d 637, 638-39 (3d Cir.

1988).
187. No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989) (WESTLAW).
188. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1099.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1101.
194. Concerning when cases involving an FSLIC receivership can be removed to federal
court, see 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1); see also Carrollton-FarmersBranch Independent School District v. Johnson & Craven, 858 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1988); Bean v. Independent American Savings Association, 838 F.2d 739, 7422 (5th Cir. 1988).
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administrative process. 195
The Fifth Circuit, affirming the dismissal, primarily referenced two
statutory provisions. Section 1464(d)(6)(c) of the Home Owners' Act
states that: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, no
court may .

. .,

except at the instance of the [FHLBB], restrain or

affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver."' 196 Section 1729(d) of the Housing Act states that:
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions [FSLIC] shall
have power ...to settle, compromise, or release claims in favor of or
against the insured institutions and to do all other things that may be
necessary in connection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the
[FHLBB]. .197

The Court explained that the statutes' legislative history indicated
that Congress wanted the FSLIC to "act quickly and decisively in
reorganizing, operating, or dissolving a failed institution, and intended that the FSLIC's ability to accomplish these goals not be interfered with by other judicial or regulatory authorities."' 98 The Court
held that the FSLIC's decision to set aside the compensation contract
was "unquestionably an exercise of ... [its] ... powers as a receiver,
analogous" to the power of a bankruptcy trustee to reject a contract,

and a challenge to that decision initially must be made in the administrative process, with only a court review of the administrative decision
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 199

195. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1099-1100 (5th Cir.
1985).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
197. Id. § 1729(d).
198. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099-1100.
199. 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1982); see also Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-03. The Fifth Circuit
did not clearly described how limited this judicial review would be. Bean v. Independent Am.
Sav. Ass'n, 838 F.2d 739, 741 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 565, n.3 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW). The Court also held that Hudspeth's claim against the new S&L must be dismissed because the FSLIC Receiver, by deciding not to transfer that obligation to the new
S&L, had determined the allocation of receivership assets to competing claimants and determined that Hudspeth's claim must be satisfied out of the assets remaining in the receivership
after the transfer of some assets to the new institution. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02. If the
court held the new S&L liable for a debt not assigned by the FSLIC, the court would modify
the FSLIC's distribution of assets and, accordingly, restrain or affect the FSLIC's receivership
powers in violation of the Homeowner's and Housing Acts. 1d. at 1102-03. However, if the
liability had been transferred, then Hudspeth does not preclude an original court action against
the assuming S&L. Bean, 838 F.2d at 742. A full discussion of a creditor's right to sue the
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The Hudspeth decision is best understood as interpreting the
quoted portions of the Housing Act and Home Owners' Act to create
a claim system similar to that in federal bankruptcy proceedings; all
claims against the S&L are centralized in one forum and any adjudication outside that forum is stayed. 20° Hudspeth applied either when
the claimant initially filed suit against the Receiver or when suit was
originally filed against the S&L which then goes into a
Receivership. 210
Hudspeth was not, however, a magic wand with which the FSLIC
could relegate any claim involving the failed S&L to the administrative process. A limitation on the FSLIC's powers was stated in
FSLIC v. Kerr,2" 2 where the FSLIC, as Receiver for an S&L with a
second lien on real property, attempted to enjoin the first lienholder's
nonjudicial foreclosure.2 °3 The lower court denied injunctive relief
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, distinguishing Hudspeth since, before
foreclosure, the property was not in the Receivership but was held by
the debtor and there was no dispute on priority of liens or anything
else which required administrative or other adjudication. 2"
The Fifth Circuit repeatedly reaffirmed Hudspeth2 05 and the decision has been followed by several other courts.20 6 One case where
financial institution which assumes the failed one's liabilities in a P&A or merger is beyond this
article's scope.
200. See First Am. Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Westside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp.
93, 98-99 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
201. See id. at 97.
202. 859 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1988).
203. Id. at 1227.
204. Id. at 1228. The Fifth Circuit also concluded that public policy supported the superior lienholder's right to foreclose inasmuch as an indefinite freeze on foreclosure unfairly
burdens the superior lienholder and places the FSLIC in a better position than the S&L would
have been in had it remained solvent.
205. Sandia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Vernon Say. & Loan Ass'n, 860 F.2d 608, 610 (5th
Cir. 1988); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Johnson & Craven, 858 F.2d
1010, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Equitable Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 837 F.2d 1317, 131718 (5th Cir. 1988); FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1987); Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, No. 23205 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 1989)(WESTLAW); Red Fox Indus., Inc. v. FSLIC, 832 F.2d 340, 341-42 (5th Cir.
1987); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269, 1270 (5th Cir. 1986).
206. Lyons Sav. & Loan v. Westside Bank Corp., 828 F.2d 387, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1987);
FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1987); York Bank & Trust v. FSLIC, 663 F.
Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Pa. 1987); First Fin. Sav. & Loan v. FSLIC, 651 F. Supp. 1289, 129091 (E.D. Ark. 1987); First Am. Sav. Bank v. Westside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp.
93, 97-100 (W.D. Wash. 1986). In GibraltarBuilding & Loan Association v. State Savings &
Loan Association, 607 F. Supp. 722, 723 (N.D. Ca. 1985), the court relied not only on Hud-
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Hudspeth was followed demonstrated that administrative preemption
can affect parties who have indirectly obtained claims against the insolvent S&L. For example, in one case a corporation retained Quality
Inns, Inc. to provide services to and buy goods for a construction
project.2 °7 The FHLBB placed the S&L that financed the project into
receivership and appointed the FSLIC Receiver. 208 The FSLIC, as
Receiver, foreclosed on and purchased corporation property which
was part of the project and sued Quality Inns for breaches of contract
and fiduciary duty and conversion.20 9 Quality Inns counterclaimed
that the FSLIC was unjustly enriched because it owned the property
benefited by Quality Inns' services without paying for those services,
and the FSLIC had converted the property provided by Quality Inns
for the project without paying. 210 The court dismissed the counterclaims under Hudspeth.21 Quality Inns was not initially a customer
or creditor of the S&L, and its claims were against the corporation,
but because of the foreclosure, insolvency, and receivership, it faced
the FSLIC and its administrative process.
Though Hudspeth was widely followed, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Morrison-Knudson Co. v. CHG International, Inc.,212
sharply disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's analysis. The Ninth Circuit
held that no statute grants the FSLIC the power, much the less the
exclusive power, to adjudicate claims against the Receivership, and
accordingly, a creditor of the failed S&L may bring an original action
in court. 213 The court argued that common-law receivers have never
speth to deny a writ of attachment against receivership assets but also on 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730(k)(1) (1982) which states that: "No attachment or execution shall be issued against the
Corporation or its property before final judgment in any action, suit, or proceeding in any
court of any state or of the United States or any territory, or any other court." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730(k)(1) (1982). The Gibraltar court rejected the plaintiff's argument that "Corporation"
in section 1730(k)(1) applied only to the FSLIC acting as a Corporation and not acting as a
Receiver. See Gibraltar,607 F. Supp. at 723 n.2. See generally Coward, The Adjudicatory
Power of the FSLIC Over ClaimsInvolving Savings and Loans in FSLIC Receivership, 88 COLO.

L. REV. 1325 (1988); Note, The FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation'sAmenability to Suit
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act for PreferentialDistributionsofAssets of an Insolvent Bank,

1981 Wis. L. REV. 593.
207. FSLIC v. Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918, 918-19 (D. Md. 1987).
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 920-22.
811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1215-19.
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had the pervasive preemption powers which Hudspeth held that
FSLIC receivers do and the FDIC Receiver never asserted such powers, at least in the Ninth Circuit.21 However, the Morrison-Knudson
court did hold that a trial court could exercise its traditional discretion to defer to the administrative process and abate court proceedings.2 5 Accordingly, even under Morrison-Knudsen, a claimant did
not have the absolute right to a court action against the Receivership.
The Texas Supreme Court followed Morrison-Knudsen in FSLIC v.
Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd.,216 where the Receiver sought to
foreclose on real estate securing defaulted loans made by the failed
S&L. The borrowers filed a lawsuit in Texas district court seeking
cancellation of the loans and an injunction against foreclosure because
of violations of security and usury laws, breach of contract, and
fraud. 217 The supreme court permitted the borrower's suit to go forward despite their failure to first administratively pursue their
claims.21 8
The holding in Hudspeth was overruled by the United States
29
Supreme Court in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,
where the plaintiff, Coit, sued an S&L for usury, breach of fiduciary
duty, and breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 220 The S&L
entered an FSLIC Receivership and the court, following Hudspeth,
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
Coit had not yet exhausted his FSLIC and FHLBB administrative
remedies. 221 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and rejected
Coit's argument that Hudspeth was no longer controlling because of a
change in the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d). 222 The Fifth Circuit
214. Id. at 1219-20.
215. Id. at 1223. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether it
should exercise this discretion. Id.

216. 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988).
217. Id. at 758.
218. See id. at 760. The Court of Appeals held that 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(C) and
1729(d) did give the FSLIC adjudicatory powers over claims against the failed S&L, however,

this was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority in violation of Article III of the
United States Constitution. See Glen Ridge I Condominiums v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374, 390
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). Because the Texas Supreme Court, like the court in Morrison-Knudsen, held that the statutes did not give adjudication rights to the FSLIC or FHLBB,
it did not address the constitutional issues.
219. No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989)(WESTLAW).
220. Id.

221. Id.
222. Id. When Hudspeth was decided, Section 1729(d) granted the FSLIC the power to
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pointed out that 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B) defines "court or other
that
public authority" in subsection (d) as the FHLBB and concluded
223
Hudspeth.
overruling
warrant
not
did
change
language
the
Coit appealed the Fifth Circuit's decision and asked the Supreme
Court to decide whether federal statutory and regulatory law requires
a creditor of a S&L in Receivership to first exhaust the FSLIC and
FHLBB administrative process and then be permitted only a court
review of that decision, and if it does, whether such a requirement
violates Article III of the United States Constitution as an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by
224
jury.
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not grant the FSLIC
exclusive authority to adjudicate state law claims asserted against a
failed S&L, and creditors of the S&L are entitled to a de novo consideration of their claims in an original court action. 225 The Court relied
on both the explicit statutory language and the statutory context of
section 1454(d)(6)(C) of the Home Owners' Act and section 1729(d)
of the Housing Act.226 The Court concluded that the FSLIC's power
under section 1464(d)(6)(C) to "settle, compromise or release claims"
was both distinguishable from, and to some extent inconsistent with,
the power to adjudicate claims.2 27 In this regard, the Court quoted
the Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen Co.:
Settlement and compromise strongly suggest the presence of the power
of the other party to take the matter to court. Settlement and compromise are to avoid that result. A body with a power to say "yes" or "no"
with the force of law has much less need to settle or to compromise.
settle, compromise, and release claims subject only to the FHLBB's regulation, but the statute

was later amended to subject the FSLIC to the regulation "of the court or other public authority having jurisdiction over the matter." The statute was again amended effective August 10,
1987 and the original language was replaced. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. 1988).

223. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. First South, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564 (5th
Cir. 1987).
224. The Fifth Circuit held that Coit did not yet have standing to assert these constitu-

tional issues since, until the FSLIC decided Coit's claims, Coit was not harmed or immediately
threatened with harm which the court held was necessary for a constitutional challenge. Id. at

565; accord Sandia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Vernon Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 860 F.2d 608, 610
(5th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 837 F.2d 1317, 1318 (5th Cir. 1988).
225. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989)

(WESTLAW).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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As to section 1729(d)'s prohibition against a court "restrain[ing] or
affect[ing]" the Receiver's powers, the Court held that since the
FSLIC does not have the power to adjudicate, an original de novo
court proceeding will not restrain or affect the FSLIC's powers.22
The Court further held that section 1729(b)(1)(B)'s directive that the
FSLIC Receiver "shall pay all valid credit obligations of the association" merely gives the FSLIC the power, like that of an ordinary insurance company, to pay those claims proved to its satisfaction, but
does not, on its face, prohibit a claimant from establishing the obligation in an original court action.22 9

The Court considered the context of these statutes. Within the statutory frame work of section 1729, Congress explicitly granted the
FSLIC the power to adjudicate violations of federal law by the S&L's
officers and directors, to issue cease and desist orders, to remove officers and directors, and to impose civil sanctions.230 Since Congress
precisely set forth this adjudicatory power, it is reasonable to infer
that it would have similarly specifically stated the FSLIC's adjudicatory powers with regard to a creditor's claims against the FSLIC
receiver.
As to the statutory context of section 1464(d)(6)(C), it appears after
section 1464(d)(6)(A) which sets out the specific grounds for the
FHLBB's appointment of a Receiver and authorizes the S&L to challenge that appointment within thirty days.2 3 ' In this context, the
Court concluded that the section 1464(d)(6)(C) prohibition against restraining or affecting the receiver's powers is no more than a prohibition against an untimely challenge to the FHLBB's appointment of a
Receiver or against collateral attacks against the Receiver carrying
out its basic functions.232
The Court also relied on the common law in effect when section
1464(d)(6)(C) was enacted, which did not hold that law suits to establish the existence or amount of a claims against an insolvent debtor
interfered with or restrained the Receiver's possession of the insol228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (Supp. V 1987); see Section II, infra.
231. See Section II, infra.
232. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW). While the court does not so hold in this portion of the opinion, it implicitly
must be stating that the "basic functions" do not include the power to adjudicate a creditor's
claims. Id.
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vent's assets or its exlusive control over the distribution of those assets.2 33 Nor were suits to establish the validity and amount of the
claims against an insolvent national bank under a statutory receivership considered an interference with the power and function of the
receiver.2 34

The Court pointed to provisions of the Housing Act which it held
clearly showed that the courts would have jurisdiction over suits by
creditors against the FSLIC Receivership. 235 The Housing Act provides that the FSLIC can sue and be sued in state or federal court.2 36

Congress has established a statute of limitations for actions against
the FSLIC Corporation to enforce deposit insurance claims, 237 and
has provided an explicit grant to the courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the FSLIC.
The Court also addressed the argument that even though the
FSLIC Receiver may not have excluded adjudicatory powers, a claimant should nonetheless be required to exhaust the administrative process before bringing suit in court. 238 The Court held that its past cases
had generally recognized that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is required when Congress explicitly imposes the requirement
when it is consistent with the applicable statutory scheme.2 39 The
Court held that although the language of the statutes governing the
FSLIC and FHLBB do not explicitly mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Housing Act does require the FSLIC to liquidate
a failed S&L in an "orderly manner." It is reasonable to conclude
that this could not be done unless the FSLIC had notice of all claims
against the insolvent institution and initial opportunity to consider
them in a centralized claim process. 240 Accordingly, the court stated
that the traditional reasons requiring an exhaustion of administrative
remedies would support a requirement that a claimant give the
FSLIC notice of the claim and then wait for a reasonable time period
before filing suit while the FSLIC decided whether to pay, settle, or
233. Id.
234. Id.

235. Id.
236. 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c)(4) (1982).
237. Id. § 1728(c).
238. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, No. 23205 (U.S. Mar. 21,
(WESTLAW).

1989)

239. Id.
240. Id.
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disallow the claim. 24 1 However, the Court reasoned that current
FHLBB regulations permit the FSLIC to delay the administrative
processing of a claim indefinitely, denying a litigant his day in court
while the statute of limitations runs.242 Additionally, this unlimited
delay may enable the FSLIC to coerce a claimant into entering into
an unfair settlement with the threat that unless the claimant settles,
there may be no assets left in the Receivership when the FSLIC permits filing a court action.2 43 Consequently, the Court concluded that
because the current administrative remedies are inadequate, they need
not be exhausted. 2 " However, if the FHLBB revises its regulations to
conform to the Court's requirements, an exhaustion may again be required. The open question would then be the extent of court review of
the final administrative decision.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The steady and not so slow unraveling of the savings and loan industry has thrust creditors and debtors of S&Ls, and their attorneys,
into unfamiliar surroundings both in and out of court. However, with
Coit, creditors may now choose whether to pursue their claims administratively or in an original court action. If the claimant chooses the
administrative process, specific procedures must be followed and
deadlines met to avoid loss of the claim. For the debtor of an S&L in
a FSLIC Receivership, his situation is difficult and will probably
worsen.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's argument that the
FHLBB could suspend a claimant's right to file a lawsuit if it required a decision on the claim
within a reasonable time period. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia points out that the
statute of limitations could run even within this reasonable time period and, in any event,
preclude a claimant from filing state law claims until they have first been acted on by the
FSLIC, or until a specific time limit for such action is passed. Justice Scalia maintains this
amounts to a pre-emption of state law and is an unprecedented interpretation of the exhaustion
requirement. Justice Scalia argues that the claimant should rather be permitted to file his
original court action and then the FSLIC could request the court to defer further proceedings
for a reasonable time until the FSLIC determines whether to deny, pay, or otherwise settle the
claim. Id.
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